1.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
2.
Craig, Edward. Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy. London: Routledge; 1998.
3.
Fisher, Andrew, Kirchin, Simon. Arguing about metaethics. London: Routledge; 2006.
4.
Miller A. Contemporary metaethics: an introduction [Internet]. Second edition. Cambridge: Polity; 2013. Available from: http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=KentUniv&isbn=9780745680514
5.
Kirchin, Simon. Metaethics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; 2012.
6.
Miller, Alexander. An introduction to contemporary metaethics. Cambridge: Polity Press; 2003.
7.
Shafer-Landau, Russ, Cuneo, Terence. Foundations of ethics: an anthology. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub; 2007.
8.
Smith, Michael. The moral problem. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell; 1994.
9.
McNaughton, David. Moral vision: an introduction to ethics. Oxford: Blackwell; 1988.
10.
Darwall, Stephen L., Gibbard, Allan, Railton, Peter Albert. Moral discourse and practice: some philosophical approaches. New York: Oxford University Press; 1997.
11.
Blackburn, Simon. Ruling passions: a theory of practical reasoning. New York: Oxford University Press; 1998.
12.
Brink, David Owen. Moral realism and the foundations of ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1989.
13.
Shafer-Landau, Russ, Oxford University Press. Moral Realism: A Defence [Internet]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2003. Available from: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0199259755/toc.html
14.
Joyce, Richard. The myth of morality [Internet]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2001. Available from: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kentuk/detail.action?docID=147335
15.
McDowell, John Henry. Mind, value, and reality. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press; 1998.
16.
Wiggins, David. Needs, values, truth: essays in the philosophy of value. 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1998.
17.
Mackie, J. L. Ethics: inventing right and wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin; 1977.
18.
Copp, David, Oxford University Press. The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory [Internet]. New York: Oxford University Press; 2005. Available from: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0195147790/toc.html
19.
http://www.lenmanethicsbibliography.group.shef.ac.uk/Bib.htm.
20.
About Philosophical Reviews - University of Notre Dame.
21.
Altman, Andrew. Breathing life in a Dead Argument... Philosophical studies [Internet]. 2004;117. Available from: databaseName
22.
Altman, J. E. J. The Legacy of Emotivism. Fact, science and morality: essays on AJ Ayer’s Language, truth and logic. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1986.
23.
Altham, J. E. J., Harrison, Ross. World, mind, and ethics: essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1995.
24.
Ayer, Alfred Jules. Language, truth and logic. 2nd ed. London: V. Gollancz; 1946.
25.
Ball, Stephen. Linguistic Institutions and Varieties of Ethical Naturalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Buffalo, New York: University of Buffalo Foundation, for the Inter- national Phenomenological Society; 1991;LI.
26.
Blackburn, Simon. Moral Realism. Essays in quasi-realism [Internet]. New York: Oxford University Press; 1993. Available from: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.kentuk.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=271411
27.
Blackburn, Simon. Spreading the word: groundings in the philosophy of language. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1984.
28.
Blackburn, Simon. Errors and the Phenomenology of Value. Essays in quasi-realism [Internet]. New York: Oxford University Press; 1993. Available from: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.kentuk.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=271411
29.
Blackburn, Simon. Errors and the Phenomenology of Value. Morality and objectivity: a tribute to J L Mackie; ed by T Honderich. [Place of publication not identified]: Routledge & Kegan Paul; 1985.
30.
Blackburn, Simon. Attitudes and Contents. Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1988;98.
31.
Blackburn, Simon. Morality and Thick Concepts: Through Thick and Thin. Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society [Internet]. 1992;LXVI. Available from: databaseName
32.
Blackburn, Simon. Essays in quasi-realism [Internet]. New York: Oxford University Press; 1993. Available from: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kentuk/detail.action?docID=271411
33.
Blackburn, Simon. Ruling passions: a theory of practical reasoning. New York: Oxford University Press; 1998.
34.
Blackburn, Simon. Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty and Minimalism. Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy. Edinburgh: Nelson; 1998;107.
35.
Blackburn, Simon. Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-Realist Foundation? Inquiry (Oslo) [Internet]. 1999;42. Available from: databaseName
36.
Blackburn, Simon. ‘Precis’ and ‘Replies’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Buffalo, New York: University of Buffalo Foundation, for the Inter- national Phenomenological Society; 2002;
37.
Blackburn, Simon, Simmons, Keith. Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1999.
38.
Bloomfield, Paul, Oxford University Press. Moral reality [Internet]. New York: Oxford University Press; 2001. Available from: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0195137132/toc.html
39.
Boghossian, Paul and Velleman, David. Colour as a secondary quality. Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy. Edinburgh: Nelson; 1989;98.
40.
Boyd, Richard. How to be a Moral Realist? Moral discourse and practice: some philosophical approaches. New York: Oxford University Press; 1997.
41.
Brink, David Owen. Moral realism and the foundations of ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1989.
42.
Brink, David. Moral Motivation. Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1997;
43.
Burgess, John. Error theories and Values. Australasian journal of philosophy [Internet]. 1998;76. Available from: databaseName
44.
Copp, David. Moral Realism: Facts and Norms. Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1991;101.
45.
Copp, David. Belief, Reason and Motivation. Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1997;
46.
Copp, David. Milk, Honey, and the Good life on Moral Twin Earth. Synthese (Dordrecht) [Internet]. 2000;124. Available from: databaseName
47.
Copp, David, Oxford University Press. The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory [Internet]. New York: Oxford University Press; 2005. Available from: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0195147790/toc.html
48.
Copp, David, Zimmerman, David. Morality, reason, and truth: new essays on the foundations of ethics. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld; 1985.
49.
Cullity, Garrett, Gaut, Berys Nigel, Ethics and Practical Reason Conference. Ethics and practical reason. New York: Oxford University Press; 1997.
50.
Cuneo, Terence. Reconcliling Realism with Humeanism. Australasian journal of philosophy [Internet]. 2002;67. Available from: databaseName
51.
Cuneo, Terence. The normative web: an argument for moral realism [Internet]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2007. Available from: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/9780199218837/toc.html
52.
Dancy, Jonathan. Two Conceptions of Moral Realism. Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society [Internet]. 1986;LX. Available from: databaseName
53.
Dancy, Jonathan. Arguments from Illusion. The Philosophical quarterly [Internet]. 1995;45. Available from: databaseName
54.
Dancy, Jonathan. Real Values in a Humean Context. Ratio (Oxford) [Internet]. 1996;9. Available from: databaseName
55.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. Sentiment and Value. Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 2000;110.
56.
Darwall, Stephen, Gibbard, Allan and Railton, Peter. Toward Fin de Siecle Ethics: Some Trends. Philosophical review. Cornell University. Sage School of Philosophy: [publisher not identified]; 1992;101.
57.
Darwall, Stephen L., Gibbard, Allan, Railton, Peter Albert. Moral discourse and practice: some philosophical approaches. New York: Oxford University Press; 1997.
58.
Davidson, Donald, Oxford University Press. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation [Internet]. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2001. Available from: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0199246297/toc.html
59.
Divers, John and Miller, Alex. Platitudes and attitudes: a minimalist conception of belief. Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell; 1995;55.
60.
Dworkin, Ronald. Objectivity and Truth... Philosophy & public affairs. Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press; 1996;25.
61.
Edwards, Jim. Anti-realist Truth and Concepts of Superassertability. Synthese (Dordrecht) [Internet]. 1996;109. Available from: databaseName
62.
Foot, Philippa. Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives. Philosophical review. Cornell University. Sage School of Philosophy: [publisher not identified]; 1972;81.
63.
Geach, P. T. Assertion. Philosophical review. Cornell University. Sage School of Philosophy: [publisher not identified]; 1965;74.
64.
Gibbard, Allan. Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1992.
65.
Gibbard, Allan. Morality and Thick Concepts: Thick concepts and Warrant for Feelings. Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society [Internet]. 1992;LXVI. Available from: databaseName
66.
Gibbard, Allan. Thinking how to live. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press; 2003.
67.
Haldane, John, Wright, Crispin, Mind Association. Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press; 1993.
68.
Hale, Bob. Postscript. Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press; 1993.
69.
Hale, Bob. Can Arboreal Knotwork Help Blackburn out of Frege’s Abyss? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Buffalo, New York: University of Buffalo Foundation, for the Inter- national Phenomenological Society; 2002;
70.
Hare, R. M. The Language of Morals. http://www.ditext.com/hare/lm/html.
71.
Harman, Gilbert. Moral Relativism Defended. Philosophical review. Cornell University. Sage School of Philosophy: [publisher not identified]; 1975;
72.
Harman, Gilbert. The nature of morality: an introduction to ethics. New York: Oxford University Press; 1977.
73.
Darwall, Stephen L., Gibbard, Allan, Railton, Peter Albert. Moral discourse and practice: some philosophical approaches. New York: Oxford University Press; 1997.
74.
Harman, Gilbert. Is There a Single True Morality? Morality, reason, and truth: new essays on the foundations of ethics. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld; 1985.
75.
Wittgenstein - to follow a rule; ed by S H Holtzman and C M Leich. [Place of publication not identified]: Routledge & Kegan Paul; 1981.
76.
Honderich, T. Morality and objectivity: a tribute to J L Mackie; ed by T Honderich. [Place of publication not identified]: Routledge & Kegan Paul; 1985.
77.
Hooker, Brad. Truth in ethics. Oxford: Blackwell; 1996.
78.
Hookway, Christopher. Two Conceptions of Moral Realism II. Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society [Internet]. 1986;LX. Available from: databaseName
79.
Hopkins, Robert. Kant, Quasi-Realism and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement. European journal of philosophy [Internet]. 2001; Available from: databaseName
80.
Horgan, Terence and Timmons, Mark. Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: the Open Question. Philosophical papers (Grahamstown) [Internet]. 1992;21. Available from: databaseName
81.
Horgan, Terence. Copping out on Moral Twin Earth. Synthese (Dordrecht) [Internet]. 2000;124. Available from: databaseName
82.
Hume, David, Beauchamp, Tom L. An enquiry concerning the principles of morals. New York: Oxford University Press; 1998.
83.
Hume, David, Mossner, Ernest Campbell. A treatise of human nature. Harmondworth: Penguin; 1985.
84.
Hume, David. Of the Standard of Taste. Essays, moral, political and literary. Oxford: O.U.P.; 1963.
85.
Humberstone, Lloyd. Directions of fit. Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy. Edinburgh: Nelson; 1992;101.
86.
Hurley, S. L. Natural reasons: personality and polity. New York: Oxford University Press; 1989.
87.
Foot, Philippa, Hursthouse, Rosalind, Lawrence, Gavin, Quinn, Warren. Virtues and reasons: Philippa Foot and moral theory: essays in honour of Philippa Foot. New York: Oxford University Press; 1995.
88.
Jackson, Frank. From metaphysics to ethics: a defence of conceptual analysis. New York: Clarendon Press; 1998.
89.
Jackson, Frank; Oppy, Graham and Smith, Michael. Minimalism and Truth-aptness. Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy. Edinburgh: Nelson; 1994;103.
90.
Jackson, Frank and Pettit, Philip. Locke, Expressivism, and Conditionals. Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell; 2003;63.
91.
Johnston, Mark. Dispositional Theories of Value. Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society [Internet]. 1989; Available from: databaseName
92.
Johnston, Mark. Objectivity Refigured: Pragmatism without Verificationism. Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press; 1993.
93.
Johnston, Mark. Art Manifest Qualities Response-dependent? The Monist [Internet]. 1998;81. Available from: databaseName
94.
Johnston, Mark. The Authority of Affect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Buffalo, New York: University of Buffalo Foundation, for the Inter- national Phenomenological Society; 2001;LXIII.
95.
Joyce, Richard. The myth of morality [Internet]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2001. Available from: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kentuk/detail.action?docID=147335
96.
Joyce, Richard. Expressivism and Motivation Internalism. Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell; 2002;62.
97.
Joyce, Richard, Kirchin, Simon. A world without values: essays on John Mackie’s moral error theory [Internet]. Dordrecht: Springer; 2010. Available from: http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=KentUniv&isbn=9789048133390
98.
Kennett, Jeanette. Agency and responsibility: a common-sense moral psychology. New York: Oxford University Press; 2001.
99.
Kirchin, Simon. Quasi-Realism, Sensibility Theory and Ethical Relativism. Inquiry (Oslo) [Internet]. 2000;43. Available from: databaseName
100.
Kirchin, Simon. Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics. Ethical theory and moral practice: an international forum. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic; 2003;6.
101.
Kirchin, Simon. The Shapelessness Hypothesis. Philosophers’ imprint [Internet]. 2010;10. Available from: databaseName
102.
Lang, Gerald. The Rule-Following Considerations and Metaethics. European journal of philosophy [Internet]. 2001;9. Available from: databaseName
103.
Lewis, David. Desire as Belief. Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy. Edinburgh: Nelson; 1988;
104.
Lewis, David. Dispositional Theories of Value. Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society [Internet]. 1989; Available from: databaseName
105.
Lillehammer, Hallvard. Smith on Moral Fetishism. Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell; 1997;57.
106.
Lillehammer, Hallvard. Moral Error Theory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society [Internet]. 2004;104. Available from: databaseName
107.
Mackie, J. L. Ethics: inventing right and wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin; 1977.
108.
McDowell, John. Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives? Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society [Internet]. 1978;LII. Available from: databaseName
109.
McDowell, John. Virtue and Reason. The Monist [Internet]. 1979;62. Available from: databaseName
110.
McDowell, John. Noncognivitism and Rule-Following. Wittgenstein - to follow a rule; ed by S H Holtzman and C M Leich. [Place of publication not identified]: Routledge & Kegan Paul; 1981.
111.
McDowell, John. Aesthetic value, Objectivity and the Fabric of the World. Mind, value, and reality. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press; 1998.
112.
McDowell, John. Values and Secondary Qualities. Morality and objectivity: a tribute to J L Mackie; ed by T Honderich. [Place of publication not identified]: Routledge & Kegan Paul; 1985.
113.
McDowell, John. Projection and Truth in Ethics. Moral discourse and practice: some philosophical approaches. New York: Oxford University Press; 1997.
114.
McDowell, John. Two Sorts of Naturalism. Virtues and reasons: Philippa Foot and moral theory: essays in honour of Philippa Foot. New York: Clarendon Press; 1995.
115.
McDowell, John. Might there be External Reasons? World, mind, and ethics: essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1995.
116.
McDowell, John Henry. Mind, value, and reality. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press; 1998.
117.
McFarland, Duncan and Miller, Alex. Response Dependence without Reduction? Australasian journal of philosophy [Internet]. 1998;76. Available from: databaseName
118.
McNaughton, David. Moral vision: an introduction to ethics. Oxford: Blackwell; 1988.
119.
Miller, Alex. Objectivity Disfigured: Mark Johnston’s Missing Explanation Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Buffalo, New York: University of Buffalo Foundation, for the Inter- national Phenomenological Society; 1995;
120.
Miller, Alex. An Objection to smith’s Argument for Internalism. Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell; 1996;56.
121.
Miller, Alex. Wright’s Argument against Error-theories. Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell; 2002;
122.
Miller, Alexander. An introduction to contemporary metaethics. Cambridge: Polity Press; 2003.
123.
Moore, A. W. Quasi-Realism and Relativism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Buffalo, New York: University of Buffalo Foundation, for the Inter- national Phenomenological Society; 2002;
124.
Moore, A. W. Williams on Ethics, Knowledge, and Reflection. Philosophy (London) [Internet]. 2003;78. Available from: databaseName
125.
Nolan, Daniel; Restall, Greg and West, Caroline. Moral Fictionalism versus the REst. Australasian journal of philosophy [Internet]. 2005;83. Available from: databaseName
126.
Oddie, Graham, Oxford University Press. Value, Reality, and Desire [Internet]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2005. Available from: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0199273413/toc.html
127.
Pettit, Philip. Realism and Response-dependence. Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy. Edinburgh: Nelson; 1991;100.
128.
Pettit, Philip and Smith, Michael. Background Desire. Philosophical review. Cornell University. Sage School of Philosophy: [publisher not identified]; 1990;
129.
Price, Huw. Defending Desire-as-Belief. Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy. Edinburgh: Nelson; 1989;
130.
Rachels, James. Ethical theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1998.
131.
Railton, Peter. Moral Realism. Philosophical review. Cornell University. Sage School of Philosophy: [publisher not identified]; 1986;95.
132.
Railton, Peter. What the Non-Cognitivist Helps Us to See the Naturalist Must Help Us to Explain. Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press; 1993.
133.
Railton, Peter. Reply to David Wiggins. Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press; 1993.
134.
Rosati, Connie. Naturalism, Normativity, and the Open Question Argument. Noûs (Bloomington, Indiana) [Internet]. 1995;29. Available from: databaseName
135.
Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. The Metaethical Problem. Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1997;
136.
Scanlon, T. M. Fear of Relativism. Virtues and reasons: Philippa Foot and moral theory: essays in honour of Philippa Foot. New York: Clarendon Press; 1995.
137.
Scheffler, Samuel. Morality through Thick and Thin. Philosophical review. Cornell University. Sage School of Philosophy: [publisher not identified]; 1987;96.
138.
Schroeder, Mark. Slaves of the Passions [Internet]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2007. Available from: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/9780199299508/toc.html
139.
Schroeder, Mark. Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism [Internet]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2008. Available from: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534654.001.0001
140.
Schnall, Ira. Philosophy of Language and Meta-ethics. The Philosophical quarterly [Internet]. 2004;54. Available from: databaseName
141.
Schueler, G. F., Oxford University Press. Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action [Internet]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2003. Available from: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0199250375/toc.html
142.
Shafer-Landau, Russ, Oxford University Press. Moral Realism: A Defence [Internet]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2003. Available from: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0199259755/toc.html
143.
Shepski, Lee. The vanishing argument from queerness. Australasian journal of philosophy [Internet]. 2008;86. Available from: databaseName
144.
Simpson, Evan. Between Internalism and Externalism in Ethics. The Philosophical quarterly [Internet]. 1999;49. Available from: databaseName
145.
Smith, Michael. Objectivity and Moral Realism: On the Significance... Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press; 1993.
146.
Smith, Michael. Why Expressivists about Value Should Love Minimalism about Truth. Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell; 1994;
147.
Smith, Michael. The moral problem. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell; 1994.
148.
Smith, Michael. Minimalism, Truth-aptitude, and Belief. Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell; 1994;54.
149.
Smith, Michael. The Argument for Internalism: Reply to Miller. Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell; 1996;56.
150.
Smith, Michael. In Defense of The Moral Problem. Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1997;
151.
Smith, Michael. Some Not-Much Discussed Problems for Non-cognitivism in Ethics. Ratio (Oxford) [Internet]. 2001;XIV. Available from: databaseName
152.
Smith, Michael. Which Passions Rule? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Buffalo, New York: University of Buffalo Foundation, for the Inter- national Phenomenological Society; 2002;
153.
Smith, Michael. Humeanism, Psychologism, and the normative. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Buffalo, New York: University of Buffalo Foundation, for the Inter- national Phenomenological Society; 2003;67.
154.
Snare, Frank. The Argument from Motivation. Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy. Edinburgh: Nelson; 1975;84.
155.
Snare, Francis. Morals, motivation, and convention: Hume’s influential doctrines. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1991.
156.
Sobel, David and Copp, David. Against direction of fit... Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell; 2001;61.
157.
Sreenivasan, Gopal. Understanding Alien Morals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Buffalo, New York: University of Buffalo Foundation, for the Inter- national Phenomenological Society; 2001;62.
158.
Stevenson, C. L. The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms. Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy. Edinburgh: Nelson; 1937;46.
159.
Strattion-Lake, Philip. Internalism and the Explanation of Belief/Motivation Changes. Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell; 1998;56.
160.
Strattion-Lake, Philip. Why Externalism is not a Problem for Intuitionists. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society [Internet]. 1999;XCIX. Available from: databaseName
161.
Stratton-Lake, Philip. Ethical intuitionism: re-evaluations. New York: Clarendon Press; 2002.
162.
Stoljar, Daniel. Deflationary Theory of Truth. http://plato.stanford.edu.archives/fall1997/entries/truth-deflationary/.
163.
Sturgeon, Nicholas. Moral Explanations. Morality, reason, and truth: new essays on the foundations of ethics. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld; 1985.
164.
Thomas, Alan. Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge [Internet]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2006. Available from: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0198250177/toc.html
165.
Tolhurst, William. The Argument from Disagreement. Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1987;97.
166.
Van Cleve, James. Minimal Truth is Realist Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Buffalo, New York: University of Buffalo Foundation, for the Inter- national Phenomenological Society; 1996;LVI.
167.
Van Roojen. Expressivism and Irrationality. Philosophical review. Cornell University. Sage School of Philosophy: [publisher not identified]; 1996;105.
168.
Van Roojen. Motivational Internalism... The Philosophical quarterly [Internet]. 2000;50. Available from: databaseName
169.
Van Roojen. Humean and Anti-Humean Internalism about Moral Judgements. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Buffalo, New York: University of Buffalo Foundation, for the Inter- national Phenomenological Society; 2002;65.
170.
Wedgwood, Ralph. Noncognitivism, Truth, and Logic. Philosophical studies [Internet]. 1997;86. Available from: databaseName
171.
Wiggins, David. Cognitivism, Naturalism and Normativity. Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press; 1993.
172.
Wiggins, David. A Neglected Position? Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press; 1993.
173.
Wiggins, David. Objective and Subjective in Ethics... Truth in ethics. Oxford: Blackwell; 1996.
174.
Wiggins, David. Needs, values, truth: essays in the philosophy of value. 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1998.
175.
Williams, Bernard. Internal and External Reasons. Moral luck: philosophical papers, 1973-1980. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press; 1981.
176.
Williams, Bernard. The Truth in Relativism. Moral luck: philosophical papers, 1973-1980. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press; 1981.
177.
Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen. Ethics and the limits of philosophy. London: Fontana Press; 1985.
178.
Williams, Bernard. Replies. World, mind, and ethics: essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1995.
179.
Wong, David B. Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism [Internet]. New York: Oxford University Press; 2006. Available from: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0195305396/toc.html
180.
Wright, Crispin. Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi-realism. Midwest studies in philosophy [Internet]. 1988;12. Available from: databaseName
181.
Wright, Crispin. Truth and objectivity. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press; 1992.
182.
Wright, Crispin. Truth in Ethics. Truth in ethics. Oxford: Blackwell; 1996.
183.
Wright, Crispin. Comrades Against Quietism. Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy. Edinburgh: Nelson; 1998;107.
184.
Zangwill, Nick. Moral Modus Ponens. Ratio (Oxford) [Internet]. 1992;V. Available from: databaseName
185.
Zangwill, Nick. Direction of fit and Normative Functionalism. Philosophical studies [Internet]. 1998;91. Available from: databaseName
186.
Zangwill, Nick. Against Analytic Moral Functionalism. Ratio (Oxford) [Internet]. 2000;13. Available from: databaseName
187.
Zangwill, Nick. Externalist Moral Motivation. American philosophical quarterly (Oxford) [Internet]. 2003;40. Available from: databaseName
188.
Zangwill, Nick. Moore, Morality, Supervenience, Essence, Epistemology. American philosophical quarterly (Oxford) [Internet]. 2005;42. Available from: databaseName
