About Philosophical Reviews - University of Notre Dame (no date).
Altham, J. E. J. and Harrison, Ross (1995) World, mind, and ethics: essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Altman and Andrew (2004) ‘Breathing life in a Dead Argument...’, Philosophical studies, 117. Available at: databaseName.
Altman and J. E. J. (1986) ‘The Legacy of Emotivism’, in Fact, science and morality: essays on A.J. Ayer’s Language, truth and logic. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Ayer, Alfred Jules (1946) Language, truth and logic. 2nd ed. London: V. Gollancz.
Ball and Stephen (1991) ‘Linguistic Institutions and Varieties of Ethical Naturalism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LI.
Blackburn, Simon (1984) Spreading the word: groundings in the philosophy of language. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Blackburn and Simon (1985) ‘Errors and the Phenomenology of Value’, in Morality and objectivity: a tribute to J L Mackie; ed by T Honderich. [Place of publication not identified]: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Blackburn and Simon (1988) ‘Attitudes and Contents’, Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy, 98.
Blackburn and Simon (1992) ‘Morality and Thick Concepts: Through Thick and Thin’, Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society, LXVI. Available at: databaseName.
Blackburn and Simon (1993a) ‘Errors and the Phenomenology of Value’, in Essays in quasi-realism. New York: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.kentuk.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=271411.
Blackburn, Simon (1993) Essays in quasi-realism. New York: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kentuk/detail.action?docID=271411.
Blackburn and Simon (1993b) ‘Moral Realism’, in Essays in quasi-realism. New York: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.kentuk.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=271411.
Blackburn, Simon (1998a) Ruling passions: a theory of practical reasoning. New York: Oxford University Press.
Blackburn, Simon (1998b) Ruling passions: a theory of practical reasoning. New York: Oxford University Press.
Blackburn and Simon (1998) ‘Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty and Minimalism’, Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy, 107.
Blackburn and Simon (1999) ‘Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-Realist Foundation?’, Inquiry (Oslo), 42. Available at: databaseName.
Blackburn and Simon (2002) ‘“Precis” and “Replies”’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research [Preprint].
Blackburn, Simon and Simmons, Keith (1999) Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bloomfield, Paul and Oxford University Press (2001) Moral reality. New York: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0195137132/toc.html.
Boghossian, Paul and Velleman, and David (1989) ‘Colour as a secondary quality’, Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy, 98.
Boyd and Richard (1997) ‘How to be a Moral Realist?’, in Moral discourse and practice: some philosophical approaches. New York: Oxford University Press.
Brink and David (1997) ‘Moral Motivation’, Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy [Preprint].
Brink, David Owen (1989a) Moral realism and the foundations of ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brink, David Owen (1989b) Moral realism and the foundations of ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Burgess and John (1998) ‘Error theories and Values’, Australasian journal of philosophy, 76. Available at: databaseName.
Copp and David (1991) ‘Moral Realism: Facts and Norms’, Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy, 101.
Copp and David (1997) ‘Belief, Reason and Motivation’, Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy [Preprint].
Copp and David (2000) ‘Milk, Honey, and the Good life on Moral Twin Earth’, Synthese (Dordrecht), 124. Available at: databaseName.
Copp, David and Oxford University Press (2005a) The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory [electronic resource]. New York: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0195147790/toc.html.
Copp, David and Oxford University Press (2005b) The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory [electronic resource]. New York: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0195147790/toc.html.
Copp, David and Zimmerman, David (1985) Morality, reason, and truth: new essays on the foundations of ethics. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld.
Craig, Edward (1998) Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy. London: Routledge.
Cullity, Garrett, Gaut, Berys Nigel, and Ethics and Practical Reason Conference (1997) Ethics and practical reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
Cuneo and Terence (2002) ‘Reconcliling Realism with Humeanism’, Australasian journal of philosophy, 67. Available at: databaseName.
Cuneo, Terence (2007) The normative web: an argument for moral realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/9780199218837/toc.html.
Dancy and Jonathan (1986) ‘Two Conceptions of Moral Realism’, Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society, LX. Available at: databaseName.
Dancy and Jonathan (1995) ‘Arguments from Illusion’, The Philosophical quarterly, 45. Available at: databaseName.
Dancy and Jonathan (1996) ‘Real Values in a Humean Context’, Ratio (Oxford), 9. Available at: databaseName.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, and Daniel (2000) ‘Sentiment and Value’, Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy, 110.
Darwall et al. (1992) ‘Toward Fin de Siecle Ethics: Some Trends’, Philosophical review, 101.
Darwall, Stephen L., Gibbard, Allan, and Railton, Peter Albert (1997a) Moral discourse and practice: some philosophical approaches. New York: Oxford University Press.
Darwall, Stephen L., Gibbard, Allan, and Railton, Peter Albert (1997b) Moral discourse and practice: some philosophical approaches. New York: Oxford University Press.
Darwall, Stephen L., Gibbard, Allan, and Railton, Peter Albert (1997c) Moral discourse and practice: some philosophical approaches. New York: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, Donald and Oxford University Press (2001) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation [electronic resource]. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0199246297/toc.html.
Divers, John and Miller, and Alex (1995) ‘Platitudes and attitudes: a minimalist conception of belief’, Analysis, 55.
Dworkin and Ronald (1996) ‘Objectivity and Truth...’, Philosophy & public affairs, 25.
Edwards and Jim (1996) ‘Anti-realist Truth and Concepts of Superassertability’, Synthese (Dordrecht), 109. Available at: databaseName.
Fisher, Andrew and Kirchin, Simon (2006) Arguing about metaethics. London: Routledge.
Foot and Philippa (1972) ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’, Philosophical review, 81.
Foot, Philippa et al. (1995) Virtues and reasons: Philippa Foot and moral theory: essays in honour of Philippa Foot. New York: Oxford University Press.
Geach and P. T. (1965) ‘Assertion’, Philosophical review, 74.
Gibbard and Allan (1992) ‘Morality and Thick Concepts: Thick concepts and Warrant for Feelings’, Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society, LXVI. Available at: databaseName.
Gibbard, Allan (1992) Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gibbard, Allan (2003) Thinking how to live. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Haldane, John, Wright, Crispin, and Mind Association (1993) Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hale and Bob (1993) ‘Postscript’, in Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hale and Bob (2002) ‘Can Arboreal Knotwork Help Blackburn out of Frege’s Abyss?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research [Preprint].
Hare and R. M. (no date) ‘The Language of Morals’, http://www.ditext.com/hare/lm/html [Preprint].
Harman and Gilbert (1975) ‘Moral Relativism Defended’, Philosophical review [Preprint].
Harman, Gilbert (1977) The nature of morality: an introduction to ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Harman and Gilbert (1985) ‘Is There a Single True Morality?’, in Morality, reason, and truth: new essays on the foundations of ethics. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld.
Honderich, T. (1985) Morality and objectivity: a tribute to J L Mackie; ed by T Honderich. [Place of publication not identified]: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Hooker, Brad (1996) Truth in ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hookway and Christopher (1986) ‘Two Conceptions of Moral Realism II’, Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society, LX. Available at: databaseName.
Hopkins and Robert (2001) ‘Kant, Quasi-Realism and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement’, European journal of philosophy [Preprint]. Available at: databaseName.
Horgan and Terence (2000) ‘Copping out on Moral Twin Earth’, Synthese (Dordrecht), 124. Available at: databaseName.
Horgan, Terence and Timmons, and Mark (1992) ‘Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: the Open Question’, Philosophical papers (Grahamstown), 21. Available at: databaseName.
http://www.lenmanethicsbibliography.group.shef.ac.uk/Bib.htm (no date).
Humberstone and Lloyd (1992) ‘Directions of fit’, Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy, 101.
Hume and David (1963) ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, in Essays, moral, political and literary. Oxford: O.U.P.
Hume, David and Beauchamp, Tom L. (1998) An enquiry concerning the principles of morals. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hume, David and Mossner, Ernest Campbell (1985) A treatise of human nature. Harmondworth: Penguin.
Hurley, S. L. (1989) Natural reasons: personality and polity. New York: Oxford University Press.
Jackson et al. (1994) ‘Minimalism and Truth-aptness’, Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy, 103.
Jackson, Frank (1998) From metaphysics to ethics: a defence of conceptual analysis. New York: Clarendon Press.
Jackson, Frank and Pettit, and Philip (2003) ‘Locke, Expressivism, and Conditionals’, Analysis, 63.
Johnston and Mark (1989) ‘Dispositional Theories of Value’, Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society [Preprint]. Available at: databaseName.
Johnston and Mark (1993) ‘Objectivity Refigured: Pragmatism without Verificationism’, in Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press.
Johnston and Mark (1998) ‘Art Manifest Qualities Response-dependent?’, The Monist, 81. Available at: databaseName.
Johnston and Mark (2001) ‘The Authority of Affect’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXIII.
Joyce, Richard (2001a) The myth of morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kentuk/detail.action?docID=147335.
Joyce, Richard (2001b) The myth of morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kentuk/detail.action?docID=147335.
Joyce and Richard (2002) ‘Expressivism and Motivation Internalism’, Analysis, 62.
Joyce, Richard and Kirchin, Simon (2010) A world without values: essays on John Mackie’s moral error theory. Dordrecht: Springer. Available at: http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=KentUniv&isbn=9789048133390.
Kennett, Jeanette (2001) Agency and responsibility: a common-sense moral psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kirchin and Simon (2000) ‘Quasi-Realism, Sensibility Theory and Ethical Relativism’, Inquiry (Oslo), 43. Available at: databaseName.
Kirchin and Simon (2003) ‘Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics’, Ethical theory and moral practice: an international forum, 6.
Kirchin and Simon (2010) ‘The Shapelessness Hypothesis’, Philosophers’ imprint, 10. Available at: databaseName.
Kirchin, Simon (2012) Metaethics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lang and Gerald (2001) ‘The Rule-Following Considerations and Metaethics’, European journal of philosophy, 9. Available at: databaseName.
Lewis and David (1988) ‘Desire as Belief’, Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy [Preprint].
Lewis and David (1989) ‘Dispositional Theories of Value’, Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society [Preprint]. Available at: databaseName.
Lillehammer and Hallvard (1997) ‘Smith on Moral Fetishism’, Analysis, 57.
Lillehammer and Hallvard (2004) ‘Moral Error Theory’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104. Available at: databaseName.
Mackie, J. L. (1977a) Ethics: inventing right and wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Mackie, J. L. (1977b) Ethics: inventing right and wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
McDowell and John (1978) ‘Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?’, Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society, LII. Available at: databaseName.
McDowell and John (1979) ‘Virtue and Reason’, The Monist, 62. Available at: databaseName.
McDowell and John (1981) ‘Noncognivitism and Rule-Following’, in Wittgenstein - to follow a rule; ed by S H Holtzman and C M Leich. [Place of publication not identified]: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
McDowell and John (1985) ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’, in Morality and objectivity: a tribute to J L Mackie; ed by T Honderich. [Place of publication not identified]: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
McDowell and John (1995a) ‘Might there be External Reasons?’, in World, mind, and ethics: essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McDowell and John (1995b) ‘Two Sorts of Naturalism’, in Virtues and reasons: Philippa Foot and moral theory: essays in honour of Philippa Foot. New York: Clarendon Press.
McDowell and John (1997) ‘Projection and Truth in Ethics’, in Moral discourse and practice: some philosophical approaches. New York: Oxford University Press.
McDowell and John (1998) ‘Aesthetic value, Objectivity and the Fabric of the World’, in Mind, value, and reality. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
McDowell, John Henry (1998a) Mind, value, and reality. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
McDowell, John Henry (1998b) Mind, value, and reality. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
McFarland, Duncan and Miller, and Alex (1998) ‘Response Dependence without Reduction?’, Australasian journal of philosophy, 76. Available at: databaseName.
McNaughton, David (1988a) Moral vision: an introduction to ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.
McNaughton, David (1988b) Moral vision: an introduction to ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Miller, A. (2013) Contemporary metaethics: an introduction [electronic resource]. Second edition. Cambridge: Polity. Available at: http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=KentUniv&isbn=9780745680514.
Miller and Alex (1995) ‘Objectivity Disfigured: Mark Johnston’s Missing Explanation Argument’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research [Preprint].
Miller and Alex (1996) ‘An Objection to smith’s Argument for Internalism’, Analysis, 56.
Miller and Alex (2002) ‘Wright’s Argument against Error-theories’, Analysis [Preprint].
Miller, Alexander (2003a) An introduction to contemporary metaethics. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Miller, Alexander (2003b) An introduction to contemporary metaethics. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Moore and A. W. (2002) ‘Quasi-Realism and Relativism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research [Preprint].
Moore and A. W. (2003) ‘Williams on Ethics, Knowledge, and Reflection’, Philosophy (London), 78. Available at: databaseName.
Nick Zangwill (no date).
Nolan et al. (2005) ‘Moral Fictionalism versus the REst’, Australasian journal of philosophy, 83. Available at: databaseName.
Oddie, Graham and Oxford University Press (2005) Value, Reality, and Desire [electronic resource]. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0199273413/toc.html.
Pettit and Philip (1991) ‘Realism and Response-dependence’, Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy, 100.
Pettit, Philip and Smith, and Michael (1990) ‘Background Desire’, Philosophical review [Preprint].
Price and Huw (1989) ‘Defending Desire-as-Belief’, Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy [Preprint].
Rachels, James (1998) Ethical theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Railton and Peter (1986) ‘Moral Realism’, Philosophical review, 95.
Railton and Peter (1993a) ‘Reply to David Wiggins’, in Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press.
Railton and Peter (1993b) ‘What the Non-Cognitivist Helps Us to See the Naturalist Must Help Us to Explain’, in Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press.
Rosati and Connie (1995) ‘Naturalism, Normativity, and the Open Question Argument’, Noûs (Bloomington, Indiana), 29. Available at: databaseName.
Sayre-McCord and Geoffrey (1997) ‘The Metaethical Problem’, Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy [Preprint].
Scanlon and T. M. (1995) ‘Fear of Relativism’, in Virtues and reasons: Philippa Foot and moral theory: essays in honour of Philippa Foot. New York: Clarendon Press.
Scheffler and Samuel (1987) ‘Morality through Thick and Thin’, Philosophical review, 96.
Schnall and Ira (2004) ‘Philosophy of Language and Meta-ethics’, The Philosophical quarterly, 54. Available at: databaseName.
Schroeder, Mark (2007) Slaves of the Passions [electronic resource]. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/9780199299508/toc.html.
Schroeder, Mark (2008) Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism [electronic resource]. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534654.001.0001.
Schueler, G. F. and Oxford University Press (2003) Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action [electronic resource]. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0199250375/toc.html.
Shafer-Landau, Russ and Cuneo, Terence (2007) Foundations of ethics: an anthology. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.
Shafer-Landau, Russ and Oxford University Press (2003a) Moral Realism: A Defence [electronic resource]. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0199259755/toc.html.
Shafer-Landau, Russ and Oxford University Press (2003b) Moral Realism: A Defence [electronic resource]. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0199259755/toc.html.
Shepski and Lee (2008) ‘The vanishing argument from queerness’, Australasian journal of philosophy, 86. Available at: databaseName.
Simpson and Evan (1999) ‘Between Internalism and Externalism in Ethics’, The Philosophical quarterly, 49. Available at: databaseName.
Smith and Michael (1993) ‘Objectivity and Moral Realism: On the Significance...’, in Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press.
Smith and Michael (1994a) ‘Minimalism, Truth-aptitude, and Belief’, Analysis, 54.
Smith, Michael (1994a) The moral problem. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell.
Smith, Michael (1994b) The moral problem. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell.
Smith and Michael (1994b) ‘Why Expressivists about Value Should Love Minimalism about Truth’, Analysis [Preprint].
Smith and Michael (1996) ‘The Argument for Internalism: Reply to Miller’, Analysis, 56.
Smith and Michael (1997) ‘In Defense of The Moral Problem’, Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy [Preprint].
Smith and Michael (2001) ‘Some Not-Much Discussed Problems for Non-cognitivism in Ethics’, Ratio (Oxford), XIV. Available at: databaseName.
Smith and Michael (2002) ‘Which Passions Rule?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research [Preprint].
Smith and Michael (2003) ‘Humeanism, Psychologism, and the normative’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67.
Snare, Francis (1991) Morals, motivation, and convention: Hume’s influential doctrines. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Snare and Frank (1975) ‘The Argument from Motivation’, Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy, 84.
Sobel, David and Copp, and David (2001) ‘Against direction of fit...’, Analysis, 61.
Sreenivasan and Gopal (2001) ‘Understanding Alien Morals’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (no date).
Stevenson and C. L. (1937) ‘The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms’, Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy, 46.
Stoljar and Daniel (no date) ‘Deflationary Theory of Truth’, http://plato.stanford.edu.archives/fall1997/entries/truth-deflationary/ [Preprint].
Strattion-Lake and Philip (1998) ‘Internalism and the Explanation of Belief/Motivation Changes’, Analysis, 56.
Strattion-Lake and Philip (1999) ‘Why Externalism is not a Problem for Intuitionists’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XCIX. Available at: databaseName.
Stratton-Lake, Philip (2002) Ethical intuitionism: re-evaluations. New York: Clarendon Press.
Sturgeon and Nicholas (1985) ‘Moral Explanations’, in Morality, reason, and truth: new essays on the foundations of ethics. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld.
Thomas, Alan (2006) Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge [electronic resource]. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0198250177/toc.html.
Tolhurst and William (1987) ‘The Argument from Disagreement’, Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy, 97.
Van Cleve and James (1996) ‘Minimal Truth is Realist Truth’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LVI.
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Van Roojen (2000) ‘Motivational Internalism...’, The Philosophical quarterly, 50. Available at: databaseName.
Van Roojen (2002) ‘Humean and Anti-Humean Internalism about Moral Judgements’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65.
Wedgwood and Ralph (1997) ‘Noncognitivism, Truth, and Logic’, Philosophical studies, 86. Available at: databaseName.
Wiggins and David (1993a) ‘A Neglected Position?’, in Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wiggins and David (1993b) ‘Cognitivism, Naturalism and Normativity’, in Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wiggins and David (1996) ‘Objective and Subjective in Ethics...’, in Truth in ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wiggins, David (1998a) Needs, values, truth: essays in the philosophy of value. 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wiggins, David (1998b) Needs, values, truth: essays in the philosophy of value. 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Williams and Bernard (1981a) ‘Internal and External Reasons’, in Moral luck: philosophical papers, 1973-1980. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press.
Williams and Bernard (1981b) ‘The Truth in Relativism’, in Moral luck: philosophical papers, 1973-1980. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press.
Williams and Bernard (1995) ‘Replies’, in World, mind, and ethics: essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen (1985) Ethics and the limits of philosophy. London: Fontana Press.
Wittgenstein - to follow a rule; ed by S H Holtzman and C M Leich (1981). [Place of publication not identified]: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Wong, David B. (2006) Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism [electronic resource]. New York: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0195305396/toc.html.
Wright and Crispin (1988) ‘Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi-realism’, Midwest studies in philosophy, 12. Available at: databaseName.
Wright, Crispin (1992) Truth and objectivity. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Wright and Crispin (1996) ‘Truth in Ethics’, in Truth in ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wright and Crispin (1998) ‘Comrades Against Quietism’, Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy, 107.
Zangwill and Nick (1992) ‘Moral Modus Ponens’, Ratio (Oxford), V. Available at: databaseName.
Zangwill and Nick (1998) ‘Direction of fit and Normative Functionalism’, Philosophical studies, 91. Available at: databaseName.
Zangwill and Nick (2000) ‘Against Analytic Moral Functionalism’, Ratio (Oxford), 13. Available at: databaseName.
Zangwill and Nick (2003) ‘Externalist Moral Motivation’, American philosophical quarterly (Oxford), 40. Available at: databaseName.
Zangwill and Nick (2005) ‘Moore, Morality, Supervenience, Essence, Epistemology’, American philosophical quarterly (Oxford), 42. Available at: databaseName.
