Metaethics



[1]

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. .

[2]

Craig, Edward, Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy. London: Routledge, 1998.

[3]

Fisher, Andrew and Kirchin, Simon, Arguing about metaethics. London: Routledge, 2006.

[4]

 A. Miller, Contemporary metaethics: an introduction, Second edition. Cambridge: Polity, 2013 [Online]. Available: http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=KentUniv&isbn=978074568 0514

[5]

Kirchin, Simon, Metaethics, vol. Palgrave philosophy today. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

[6]

Miller, Alexander, An introduction to contemporary metaethics. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003.

[7]

Shafer-Landau, Russ and Cuneo, Terence, Foundations of ethics: an anthology, vol. Blackwell philosophy anthologies. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2007.

[8]

Smith, Michael, The moral problem, vol. Philosophical theory. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1994.

[9]

McNaughton, David, Moral vision: an introduction to ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, 1988.

[10]

Darwall, Stephen L., Gibbard, Allan, and Railton, Peter Albert, Moral discourse and practice: some philosophical approaches. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

[11]

Blackburn, Simon, Ruling passions: a theory of practical reasoning. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

[12]

Brink, David Owen, Moral realism and the foundations of ethics, vol. Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

[13]

Shafer-Landau, Russ and Oxford University Press, Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003 [Online]. Available: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/p ublic/content/philosophy/0199259755/toc.html

[14]

Joyce, Richard, The myth of morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 [Online]. Available: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kentuk/detail.action?docID=147335

[15]

McDowell, John Henry, Mind, value, and reality. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998.

[16]

Wiggins, David, Needs, values, truth: essays in the philosophy of value, 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.

[17]

Mackie, J. L., Ethics: inventing right and wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977.

[18]

Copp, David and Oxford University Press, The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005 [Online]. Available: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/p ublic/content/philosophy/0195147790/toc.html

[19]

'http://www.lenmanethicsbibliography.group.shef.ac.uk/Bib.htm'...

[20]

'About Philosophical Reviews - University of Notre Dame'. .

[21]

Altman and Andrew, 'Breathing life in a Dead Argument...', Philosophical studies, vol. 117,

2004 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[22]

Altman and J. E. J., 'The Legacy of Emotivism', in Fact, science and morality: essays on A.J. Ayer's Language, truth and logic, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

[23]

Altham, J. E. J. and Harrison, Ross, World, mind, and ethics: essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

[24]

Ayer, Alfred Jules, Language, truth and logic, 2nd ed. London: V. Gollancz, 1946.

[25]

Ball and Stephen, 'Linguistic Institutions and Varieties of Ethical Naturalism', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LI, 1991.

[26]

Blackburn and Simon, 'Moral Realism', in Essays in quasi-realism, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993 [Online]. Available: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.kentuk.eblib.com/patron/Full Record.aspx?p=271411

[27]

Blackburn, Simon, Spreading the word: groundings in the philosophy of language. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

[28]

Blackburn and Simon, 'Errors and the Phenomenology of Value', in Essays in quasi-realism, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993 [Online]. Available: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.kentuk.eblib.com/patron/Full Record.aspx?p=271411

[29]

Blackburn and Simon, 'Errors and the Phenomenology of Value', in Morality and objectivity: a tribute to J L Mackie; ed by T Honderich, [Place of publication not identified]: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985.

[30]

Blackburn and Simon, 'Attitudes and Contents', Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy, vol. 98, 1988.

[31]

Blackburn and Simon, 'Morality and Thick Concepts: Through Thick and Thin', Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society, vol. LXVI, 1992 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[32]

Blackburn, Simon, Essays in quasi-realism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993 [Online]. Available: https://ebookcentral.proguest.com/lib/kentuk/detail.action?docID=271411

[33]

Blackburn, Simon, Ruling passions: a theory of practical reasoning. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

[34]

Blackburn and Simon, 'Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty and Minimalism', Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy, vol. 107, 1998.

[35]

Blackburn and Simon, 'Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-Realist

Foundation?', Inquiry (Oslo), vol. 42, 1999 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[36]

Blackburn and Simon, "Precis" and "Replies", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 2002.

[37]

Blackburn, Simon and Simmons, Keith, Truth, vol. Oxford readings in philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

[38]

Bloomfield, Paul and Oxford University Press, Moral reality. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001 [Online]. Available: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/p ublic/content/philosophy/0195137132/toc.html

[39]

Boghossian, Paul and Velleman, and David, 'Colour as a secondary quality', Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy, vol. 98, 1989.

[40]

Boyd and Richard, 'How to be a Moral Realist?', in Moral discourse and practice: some philosophical approaches, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

[41]

Brink, David Owen, Moral realism and the foundations of ethics, vol. Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

[42]

Brink and David, 'Moral Motivation', Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy, 1997.

[43]

Burgess and John, 'Error theories and Values', Australasian journal of philosophy, vol. 76, 1998 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[44]

Copp and David, 'Moral Realism: Facts and Norms', Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy, vol. 101, 1991.

[45]

Copp and David, 'Belief, Reason and Motivation', Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy, 1997.

[46]

Copp and David, 'Milk, Honey, and the Good life on Moral Twin Earth', Synthese (Dordrecht), vol. 124, 2000 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[47]

Copp, David and Oxford University Press, The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005 [Online]. Available: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/p ublic/content/philosophy/0195147790/toc.html

[48]

Copp, David and Zimmerman, David, Morality, reason, and truth: new essays on the foundations of ethics. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985.

[49]

Cullity, Garrett, Gaut, Berys Nigel, and Ethics and Practical Reason Conference, Ethics and practical reason. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

[50]

Cuneo and Terence, 'Reconcliling Realism with Humeanism', Australasian journal of philosophy, vol. 67, 2002 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[51]

Cuneo, Terence, The normative web: an argument for moral realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 [Online]. Available: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/p ublic/content/philosophy/9780199218837/toc.html

[52]

Dancy and Jonathan, 'Two Conceptions of Moral Realism', Supplementary volume -Aristotelian Society, vol. LX, 1986 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[53]

Dancy and Jonathan, 'Arguments from Illusion', The Philosophical quarterly, vol. 45, 1995 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[54]

Dancy and Jonathan, 'Real Values in a Humean Context', Ratio (Oxford), vol. 9, 1996 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[55]

D'Arms, Justin and Jacobson, and Daniel, 'Sentiment and Value', Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy, vol. 110, 2000.

[56]

Darwall, Stephen, Gibbard, Allan and Railton, and Peter, 'Toward Fin de Siecle Ethics: Some Trends', Philosophical review, vol. 101, 1992. Darwall, Stephen L., Gibbard, Allan, and Railton, Peter Albert, Moral discourse and practice: some philosophical approaches. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

[58]

Davidson, Donald and Oxford University Press, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 [Online]. Available: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/p ublic/content/philosophy/0199246297/toc.html

[59]

Divers, John and Miller, and Alex, 'Platitudes and attitudes: a minimalist conception of belief', Analysis, vol. 55, 1995.

[60]

Dworkin and Ronald, 'Objectivity and Truth...', Philosophy & public affairs, vol. 25, 1996.

[61]

Edwards and Jim, 'Anti-realist Truth and Concepts of Superassertability', Synthese (Dordrecht), vol. 109, 1996 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[62]

Foot and Philippa, 'Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives', Philosophical review, vol. 81, 1972.

[63]

Geach and P. T., 'Assertion', Philosophical review, vol. 74, 1965.

[64]

Gibbard, Allan, Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment, vol. Clarendon paperbacks. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.

[65]

Gibbard and Allan, 'Morality and Thick Concepts: Thick concepts and Warrant for Feelings', Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society, vol. LXVI, 1992 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[66]

Gibbard, Allan, Thinking how to live. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003.

[67]

Haldane, John, Wright, Crispin, and Mind Association, Reality, representation, and projection, vol. Mind Association occasional series. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

[68]

Hale and Bob, 'Postscript', in Reality, representation, and projection, vol. Mind Association occasional series, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

[69]

Hale and Bob, 'Can Arboreal Knotwork Help Blackburn out of Frege's Abyss?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2002.

[70]

Hare and R. M., 'The Language of Morals', http://www.ditext.com/hare/lm/html.

[71]

Harman and Gilbert, 'Moral Relativism Defended', Philosophical review, 1975.

[72]

Harman, Gilbert, The nature of morality: an introduction to ethics. New York: Oxford

University Press, 1977.

[73]

Darwall, Stephen L., Gibbard, Allan, and Railton, Peter Albert, Moral discourse and practice: some philosophical approaches. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

[74]

Harman and Gilbert, 'Is There a Single True Morality?', in Morality, reason, and truth: new essays on the foundations of ethics, Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985.

[75]

Wittgenstein - to follow a rule; ed by S H Holtzman and C M Leich. [Place of publication not identified]: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.

[76]

Honderich, T., Morality and objectivity: a tribute to J L Mackie; ed by T Honderich. [Place of publication not identified]: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985.

[77]

Hooker, Brad, Truth in ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.

[78]

Hookway and Christopher, 'Two Conceptions of Moral Realism II', Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society, vol. LX, 1986 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[79]

Hopkins and Robert, 'Kant, Quasi-Realism and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement', European journal of philosophy, 2001 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[80]

Horgan, Terence and Timmons, and Mark, 'Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: the Open Question', Philosophical papers (Grahamstown), vol. 21, 1992 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[81]

Horgan and Terence, 'Copping out on Moral Twin Earth', Synthese (Dordrecht), vol. 124, 2000 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[82]

Hume, David and Beauchamp, Tom L., An enquiry concerning the principles of morals, vol. Oxford philosophical texts. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

[83]

Hume, David and Mossner, Ernest Campbell, A treatise of human nature, vol. Penguin classics. Harmondworth: Penguin, 1985.

[84]

Hume and David, 'Of the Standard of Taste', in Essays, moral, political and literary, Oxford: O.U.P., 1963.

[85]

Humberstone and Lloyd, 'Directions of fit', Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy, vol. 101, 1992.

[86]

Hurley, S. L., Natural reasons: personality and polity. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

[87]

Foot, Philippa, Hursthouse, Rosalind, Lawrence, Gavin, and Quinn, Warren, Virtues and reasons: Philippa Foot and moral theory: essays in honour of Philippa Foot. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

[88]

Jackson, Frank, From metaphysics to ethics: a defence of conceptual analysis. New York: Clarendon Press, 1998.

[89]

Jackson, Frank; Oppy, Graham and Smith, and Michael, 'Minimalism and Truth-aptness', Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy, vol. 103, 1994.

[90]

Jackson, Frank and Pettit, and Philip, 'Locke, Expressivism, and Conditionals', Analysis, vol. 63, 2003.

[91]

Johnston and Mark, 'Dispositional Theories of Value', Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society, 1989 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[92]

Johnston and Mark, 'Objectivity Refigured: Pragmatism without Verificationism', in Reality, representation, and projection, vol. Mind Association occasional series, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

[93]

Johnston and Mark, 'Art Manifest Qualities Response-dependent?', The Monist, vol. 81, 1998 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[94]

Johnston and Mark, 'The Authority of Affect', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,

vol. LXIII, 2001.

[95]

Joyce, Richard, The myth of morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 [Online]. Available: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kentuk/detail.action?docID=147335

[96]

Joyce and Richard, 'Expressivism and Motivation Internalism', Analysis, vol. 62, 2002.

[97]

Joyce, Richard and Kirchin, Simon, A world without values: essays on John Mackie's moral error theory, vol. Philosophical studies series. Dordrecht: Springer, 2010 [Online]. Available:

http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=KentUniv&isbn=9789048133390

[98]

Kennett, Jeanette, Agency and responsibility: a common-sense moral psychology. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

[99]

Kirchin and Simon, 'Quasi-Realism, Sensibility Theory and Ethical Relativism', Inquiry (Oslo), vol. 43, 2000 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[100]

Kirchin and Simon, 'Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics', Ethical theory and moral practice: an international forum, vol. 6, 2003.

[101]

Kirchin and Simon, 'The Shapelessness Hypothesis', Philosophers' imprint, vol. 10, 2010

[Online]. Available: databaseName

[102]

Lang and Gerald, 'The Rule-Following Considerations and Metaethics', European journal of philosophy, vol. 9, 2001 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[103]

Lewis and David, 'Desire as Belief', Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy, 1988.

[104]

Lewis and David, 'Dispositional Theories of Value', Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society, 1989 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[105]

Lillehammer and Hallvard, 'Smith on Moral Fetishism', Analysis, vol. 57, 1997.

[106]

Lillehammer and Hallvard, 'Moral Error Theory', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 104, 2004 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[107]

Mackie, J. L., Ethics: inventing right and wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977.

[108]

McDowell and John, 'Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?', Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society, vol. LII, 1978 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[109]

McDowell and John, 'Virtue and Reason', The Monist, vol. 62, 1979 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[110]

McDowell and John, 'Noncognivitism and Rule-Following', in Wittgenstein - to follow a rule; ed by S H Holtzman and C M Leich, [Place of publication not identified]: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.

[111]

McDowell and John, 'Aesthetic value, Objectivity and the Fabric of the World', in Mind, value, and reality, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998.

[112]

McDowell and John, 'Values and Secondary Qualities', in Morality and objectivity: a tribute to J L Mackie; ed by T Honderich, [Place of publication not identified]: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985.

[113]

McDowell and John, 'Projection and Truth in Ethics', in Moral discourse and practice: some philosophical approaches, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

[114]

McDowell and John, 'Two Sorts of Naturalism', in Virtues and reasons: Philippa Foot and moral theory: essays in honour of Philippa Foot, New York: Clarendon Press, 1995.

[115]

McDowell and John, 'Might there be External Reasons?', in World, mind, and ethics: essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard Williams, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

[116]

McDowell, John Henry, Mind, value, and reality. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998.

[117]

McFarland, Duncan and Miller, and Alex, 'Response Dependence without Reduction?', Australasian journal of philosophy, vol. 76, 1998 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[118]

McNaughton, David, Moral vision: an introduction to ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, 1988.

[119]

Miller and Alex, 'Objectivity Disfigured: Mark Johnston's Missing Explanation Argument', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1995.

[120]

Miller and Alex, 'An Objection to smith's Argument for Internalism', Analysis, vol. 56, 1996.

[121]

Miller and Alex, 'Wright's Argument against Error-theories', Analysis, 2002.

[122]

Miller, Alexander, An introduction to contemporary metaethics. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003.

[123]

Moore and A. W., 'Quasi-Realism and Relativism', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2002.

[124]

Moore and A. W., 'Williams on Ethics, Knowledge, and Reflection', Philosophy (London), vol. 78, 2003 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[125]

Nolan, Daniel; Restall, Greg and West, and Caroline, 'Moral Fictionalism versus the REst', Australasian journal of philosophy, vol. 83, 2005 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[126]

Oddie, Graham and Oxford University Press, Value, Reality, and Desire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005 [Online]. Available: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/p ublic/content/philosophy/0199273413/toc.html

[127]

Pettit and Philip, 'Realism and Response-dependence', Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy, vol. 100, 1991.

[128]

Pettit, Philip and Smith, and Michael, 'Background Desire', Philosophical review, 1990.

[129]

Price and Huw, 'Defending Desire-as-Belief', Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy, 1989.

[130]

Rachels, James, Ethical theory, vol. Oxford readings in philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

[131]

Railton and Peter, 'Moral Realism', Philosophical review, vol. 95, 1986.

[132]

Railton and Peter, 'What the Non-Cognitivist Helps Us to See the Naturalist Must Help Us to Explain', in Reality, representation, and projection, vol. Mind Association occasional series, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

[133]

Railton and Peter, 'Reply to David Wiggins', in Reality, representation, and projection, vol. Mind Association occasional series, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

[134]

Rosati and Connie, 'Naturalism, Normativity, and the Open Question Argument', Noûs (Bloomington, Indiana), vol. 29, 1995 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[135]

Sayre-McCord and Geoffrey, 'The Metaethical Problem', Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy, 1997.

[136]

Scanlon and T. M., 'Fear of Relativism', in Virtues and reasons: Philippa Foot and moral theory: essays in honour of Philippa Foot, New York: Clarendon Press, 1995.

[137]

Scheffler and Samuel, 'Morality through Thick and Thin', Philosophical review, vol. 96, 1987.

[138]

Schroeder, Mark, Slaves of the Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 [Online]. Available: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/p ublic/content/philosophy/9780199299508/toc.html

[139]

Schroeder, Mark, Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 [Online]. Available: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/978 0199534654.001.0001

[140]

Schnall and Ira, 'Philosophy of Language and Meta-ethics', The Philosophical quarterly, vol. 54, 2004 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[141]

Schueler, G. F. and Oxford University Press, Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003 [Online]. Available:

http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/0199250375/toc.html

[142]

Shafer-Landau, Russ and Oxford University Press, Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003 [Online]. Available: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/p ublic/content/philosophy/0199259755/toc.html

[143]

Shepski and Lee, 'The vanishing argument from queerness', Australasian journal of philosophy, vol. 86, 2008 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[144]

Simpson and Evan, 'Between Internalism and Externalism in Ethics', The Philosophical quarterly, vol. 49, 1999 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[145]

Smith and Michael, 'Objectivity and Moral Realism: On the Significance...', in Reality, representation, and projection, vol. Mind Association occasional series, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

[146]

Smith and Michael, 'Why Expressivists about Value Should Love Minimalism about Truth', Analysis, 1994.

[147]

Smith, Michael, The moral problem, vol. Philosophical theory. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1994.

[148]

Smith and Michael, 'Minimalism, Truth-aptitude, and Belief', Analysis, vol. 54, 1994.

[149]

Smith and Michael, 'The Argument for Internalism: Reply to Miller', Analysis, vol. 56, 1996.

[150]

Smith and Michael, 'In Defense of The Moral Problem', Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy, 1997.

[151]

Smith and Michael, 'Some Not-Much Discussed Problems for Non-cognitivism in Ethics', Ratio (Oxford), vol. XIV, 2001 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[152]

Smith and Michael, 'Which Passions Rule?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,

2002.

[153]

Smith and Michael, 'Humeanism, Psychologism, and the normative', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 67, 2003.

[154]

Snare and Frank, 'The Argument from Motivation', Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy, vol. 84, 1975.

[155]

Snare, Francis, Morals, motivation, and convention: Hume's influential doctrines, vol. Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

[156]

Sobel, David and Copp, and David, 'Against direction of fit...', Analysis, vol. 61, 2001.

[157]

Sreenivasan and Gopal, 'Understanding Alien Morals', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 62, 2001.

[158]

Stevenson and C. L., 'The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms', Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy, vol. 46, 1937.

[159]

Strattion-Lake and Philip, 'Internalism and the Explanation of Belief/Motivation Changes', Analysis, vol. 56, 1998.

[160]

Strattion-Lake and Philip, 'Why Externalism is not a Problem for Intuitionists', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. XCIX, 1999 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[161]

Stratton-Lake, Philip, Ethical intuitionism: re-evaluations. New York: Clarendon Press, 2002.

[162]

Stoljar and Daniel, 'Deflationary Theory of Truth', http://plato.stanford.edu.archives/fall1997/entries/truth-deflationary/.

[163]

Sturgeon and Nicholas, 'Moral Explanations', in Morality, reason, and truth: new essays on the foundations of ethics, Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985.

[164]

Thomas, Alan, Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 [Online]. Available: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/p ublic/content/philosophy/0198250177/toc.html

[165]

Tolhurst and William, 'The Argument from Disagreement', Ethics: an international journal of social political and legal philosophy, vol. 97, 1987.

[166]

Van Cleve and James, 'Minimal Truth is Realist Truth', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LVI, 1996.

Van Roojen, 'Expressivism and Irrationality', Philosophical review, vol. 105, 1996.

[168]

Van Roojen, 'Motivational Internalism...', The Philosophical quarterly, vol. 50, 2000 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[169]

Van Roojen, 'Humean and Anti-Humean Internalism about Moral Judgements', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 65, 2002.

[170]

Wedgwood and Ralph, 'Noncognitivism, Truth, and Logic', Philosophical studies, vol. 86, 1997 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[171]

Wiggins and David, 'Cognitivism, Naturalism and Normativity', in Reality, representation, and projection, vol. Mind Association occasional series, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

[172]

Wiggins and David, 'A Neglected Position?', in Reality, representation, and projection, vol. Mind Association occasional series, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

[173]

Wiggins and David, 'Objective and Subjective in Ethics...', in Truth in ethics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.

[174]

Wiggins, David, Needs, values, truth: essays in the philosophy of value, 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.

[175]

Williams and Bernard, 'Internal and External Reasons', in Moral luck: philosophical papers, 1973-1980, Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

[176]

Williams and Bernard, 'The Truth in Relativism', in Moral luck: philosophical papers, 1973-1980, Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

[177]

Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen, Ethics and the limits of philosophy, vol. Fontana masterguides. London: Fontana Press, 1985.

[178]

Williams and Bernard, 'Replies', in World, mind, and ethics: essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard Williams, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

[179]

Wong, David B., Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006 [Online]. Available: http://library.kent.ac.uk/cgi-bin/resources.cgi?url=http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/p ublic/content/philosophy/0195305396/toc.html

[180]

Wright and Crispin, 'Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi-realism', Midwest studies in philosophy, vol. 12, 1988 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[181]

Wright, Crispin, Truth and objectivity. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992.

[182]

Wright and Crispin, 'Truth in Ethics', in Truth in ethics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.

[183]

Wright and Crispin, 'Comrades Against Quietism', Mind: quarterly review of psychology and philosophy, vol. 107, 1998.

[184]

Zangwill and Nick, 'Moral Modus Ponens', Ratio (Oxford), vol. V, 1992 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[185]

Zangwill and Nick, 'Direction of fit and Normative Functionalism', Philosophical studies, vol. 91, 1998 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[186]

Zangwill and Nick, 'Against Analytic Moral Functionalism', Ratio (Oxford), vol. 13, 2000 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[187]

Zangwill and Nick, 'Externalist Moral Motivation', American philosophical quarterly (Oxford) , vol. 40, 2003 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[188]

Zangwill and Nick, 'Moore, Morality, Supervenience, Essence, Epistemology', American philosophical quarterly (Oxford), vol. 42, 2005 [Online]. Available: databaseName

[189]

'Nick Zangwill'. .